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ELECTION MONITORING: THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SETTING
GREGORY H. FOx*

i.

INTRODUCTION

International law, like all law, is essentially reactive in nature. Norms
and institutions generally arise not in a vacuum or as part of a coherent
theoretical scheme, but in response to specific events. Sometimes these are
events limited to a particular area of human endeavor, such as the launching
of Sputnik in the late 1950s, which gave rise to a new international law of
Outer Space, or the rising ecological consciousness of the early 1970s
spurring the emergence of an international law of the environment. But the
triggering events have also been more general. As David Bederman observes,
"[o]ne can almost linearly chart the progress of new international
organizations, new substantive rules of international conduct, and new
procedures of dispute settlement between international actors by the dates that
mark the end of cataclysmic wars.",
The end of the Cold War certainly qualifies as one such general
trigger. The changes in virtually all areas of international law that have
followed on the demise of bipolar ideological rivalry are, arguably,
comparable to those attending the end of the "hot" wars described by
Bedennan. This Symposium is focused on one trend emerging from the
events of 1989: the transitions from various forms of authoritarian
government to species of liberal democratic constitutionalism. Here, the link
between the triggering event and the normative innovation seems undeniable,
for it is the emergence of democracy in so many different states that is the
very subject of the new international law and institutions. An increasing
number of scholars - admittedly concentrated in the West and, more
specifically, in the United States - has identified an emerging "right to
democratic governance" or "democratic entitlement.' 2 According to this
view, both established and newly-democratic states have enlisted the tools of
international law to help secure their political institutions and to encourage
democratic transitions elsewhere. Such efforts have been encouraged both by
a local and global "demonstration effect, ' 3 as well as the increasingly
corrmon view among international organizations that democratic governance
is the form of rule most consistent with global standards of human rights.'
Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School ol Law.
DAVID J. BEDERMAN. INTERNAIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 3 (2001).
2 For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see generally DENIOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
3 See Laurence Whitehead. Three International Dimensions
"of
Democratization, in TIlE
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRATIZATION 3, 21-22 (Laurence Whitehead ed., 1996).

Report of the Secretary-General, The Causes of'Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and
Sustainable )evelopment in Africa. para. 77 (1998) ("[d]emocratic government helps to
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The profound disagreements of political ideology that marked the
Cold War were the most obvious barrier to democracy gaining a foothold in
international law. There was also another reason: the alliances forged by the
two superpowers had no necessary connection to the mode or quality of
governance in third states, but turned instead on their external loyalties. Most
liberal democracies were clearly in the Western camp. But the United States
also relied on many non-democratic states as allies against the Soviet bloc
(e.g. Vietnam, Guatemala, Iran, the Phillipines), as well as regarding a
number of democratic states as pursuing uncomfortably pro-Soviet policies
(e.g. India). Thus, democratic governance as a question of international
relations contained both an internal and an external component. The internal
component involved the traditional issues of political theory surrounding the
value of democracy as a political organizing principle. The external
component involved the utility of democracy to relations between states and
the goals defining those relationships. In this way, the external component
focused not on the question of whether and how democracy would benefit
individual citizens within a particular state, but how purely state-to-state
relations would be affected by a principle of domestic governance.'
In the post-Cold War era, our assessment of democracy as a norm of
international law must not lose sight of these two analytically distinct
categories. I will argue in this brief paper that while much of the evidence for
an emerging democratic entitlement falls into the first category - involving
clarifications of what is meant by "democracy" in an international legal
context and how the concept is to be applied in states that are broadly diverse
in culture, history and resources - the more interesting questions fall into the
second category. Why would democratic transitions be of interest to states in
their relations purely inter se? What would be the consequences of
enshrining a concept of democratic legitimacy as a rule of international law'?
And how would a norm of democratic governance relate to other foundational
tenets of the international legal order, such as recognition of states and

governments, non-intervention and the protection of human rights'?
These questions generally do not arise in the case of other human
rights, for however vigorously other states may condemn acts of torture or
discrimination, for example, there is no necessary connection between
violations of those rights and continued normal relations between the
violating and condemning states. Indeed, depending on the human rights
treaty involved, the condemning state may not even have a means by which
guara1tee political rights, protect economic freedoms and tester an environment where peace and
development can flourish"). See also Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, The Spread o/Liberal
Democracy'and its nplications lbi InternationalLa w, in Fox & ROHn, supra note 2, at 6-7.
See generally DAVID I-HEtLD,
DIEMOCRACY ANDT TIlE (iLOBAL ORDER ( 1995).
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to assert a claim for the violation itself. I will suggest that in the case of a
democratic entitlement, by contrast, broader relations between states are
necessarily implicated by debate over whether the right is respected. As the
case of apartheid South Africa suggests, a principle of regime legitimacy
potentially affects evei-, area of interaction between a suspect state and the
rest of the international community.
II.

GROUNDING OF RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE

Even apart from the distortions of the Cold War era, it is not
surprising that the idea of a democratic norm came late to international law.
In the early stages of the Westphalian era, when the states of Western Europe
were still consolidating their control over territory and acquiring the various
governmental functions soon to be understood, collectively, as the attribute of
national sovereignty, international law was very much in service of the statebuilding enterprise.7 In asserting a monopoly of authority over the territory,
the first imperative for states was to forbid external interference in national
politics. Accordingly, as the state's monopoly on domestic authority became
entrenched, especially with the rise ofjustificatory ideologies of nationalism
in the 19th Century, international law endowed domestic political institutions
with a wall of protection both from interference by other states and from any
international norms dictating the ways in which government ought to be
structured.!
As in the case of most human rights, this virtual exclusivity of
domestic control persisted until after the Second World War. And as with
other rights, concerted international interest emerged slowly, first with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and thereafter in the various
6

Some human rights instruments allow for optional procedures whereby one state party can bring a
complaint against another. See. e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 41,
G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR. 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966);

American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21, 1969, art. 45, II U.N.T.S. 123; Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2 I, G.A.
Res.39/46, Attex 39, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51- at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
However, few state parties have accepted state-to-state procedures.
See generally DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGINTY (2001); SrEV:N D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY:

ORGANIZED

HYPOCRISY

(1999);

STATE

SOVEREIGNT':

CHANGE

AND

PERSISTENCE IN INTERNATIONAL REtLATIONS (Sohail Hashmi ed., 1997).

See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation inInternational Law,in FOX & ROTH,

supra note 2, at 50-51. Excluded, ofcourse, were the acts of western states in what is now the
developing world. Because European international law ofthe time did not regard these territories

as states, the actions of colonial powers occurred wholly outside this general principle of noninterference. See WALTER C. PELLO, JR. & STEPIEN .1.ROSOW, TiE NATION-STATE AND
GLOBAL ORDER 161-80 (1999).
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regional and global human rights instruments that followed. Each of these
instruments contained an article guaranteeing, in differing formulations, a
right to participate in national government, including the right to periodic and
genuine elections." Two aspects of these treaty articles are noteworthy. First,
unlike the other rights set out in post-War treaties, enjoyment of the right to
political participation is limited to "citizens." This stands in contrast to the
scope of a state's obligations in regard to other rights, which must be
guaranteed "to all individuals within [a state party's] territory and subject to
its jurisdiction."'' The treaties thus posit standards for the conduct of relations
between governments and their citizens, a radical departure from the old nonintervention principle."
Second, the Universal Declaration, the foundational document of the
human rights regime, describes not only the substance of the right but also the
theory of popular sovereignty on which the right is based. In the words of
Article 21: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government." This assertion of a political teleology suggests a link between
exercise of a right to political participation and the legitimate exercise of
political power, a connection not present in the elaboration of other rights.
The right to participation thus implies that when governmental power is
brought to bear on citizens, that power takes on a special hue, for citizens are
the ultimate repositors of authority for the government to act under aiy
circumstances. This view is familiar as social contract theory.
But one cannot conclude from the text of these instruments that
notions of Lockean contractarianisrn entered general international law, or
even the law binding on parties to human rights treaties. While the treaties
were widely ratified, the precise meaning of the right to political participation
remained highly indetermlinate.' 2 Cold War divisions produced irreconcilable
divisions on the legitimacy of "peoples democracies," the acceptability of
one-party states and other issues related to electoral structure and fairness,
such as state ownership of media outlets. If serious debate over these sorts of
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supro note 6, art. 25; Protocol to the
Convention of the Protection of I-Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art 3, 2 13 U.N.T.S.
262 (I 952); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 23; African Charter on
.See International

Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 13, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/6713 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M.
581 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). For a discussion of these treaty provisions, see Gregory
I-. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALtE J. INT'L L. 540
(1992).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6, art. 2( ).
See Allan Rosas, Article 21, in Titl UNIVERSAL )ECILARATION OF HUMAN RiGHt'S: A
COMMiENTARY 299 (AsbJorn L[ide, et al. eds., 1992) (article 21 of the Universal )eclaration is
'primarily concerned with members of a given political commutinity (citizens) rather than with
individuals as such").
12 On normative determinacy generally, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, Tit POWER OF LEtZrIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 50-66 (1990).
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issues seems inconceivable today, it may be useful to recall a representative
statement of the Soviet delegate to the Third Committee of the General
Assembly during debate over the Universal Declaration: "in his country, the
bourgeois class had ceased to exist. There thus remained only workers and
peasants, and the Communist Party by itself was capable of looking after their
interests ...Under the prevailing system, there was no justification for the
creation of other parties." 3 In this climate, with the lone exception of a few
decisions of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights,
international human rights bodies produced virtually no jurisprudence that
might clarify the possible meanings given to such treaty terms as "genuine
periodic elections,"'" "free elections,"" "the free expression of the will of the
voters,"" and "the right to freely participate in the government of his
country."' 7
The end of the Cold War and the fall of various fonns of
authoritarian government in all regions of the world have had, what might be
termed, qualitative and quantitative consequences for the treaty-based right to
political participation. Qualitatively, an increasingly rich jurisprudence
emanating from human rights treaty bodies, and an even richer repertoire of
practice by international election observers, has clarified most, if not all,
definitional ambiguities in the right to political participation." The question
of the legitimacy of the one party state, for example, has been answered
resoundingly in the negative, with all major treaty bodies opining that an
election cannot be considered free and fair in the absence of party pluralism.'
UN election observers have also consistently rejected the blanket exclusion of
non-incumbent parties or selective exclusions based on ideology, ethnicity or
other grounds prohibited by anti-discrimination norms.2:
This rather unique combination ofjurisprudential convergence and
widespread practice (occurring mostly in regions of the world in which
opposition to western notions of pluralism was strongest during the Cold
War), has done much to clarify and standardize both general principles of
political participation and specific criteria concerning elections. While one
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess, 134th mtg. at 47 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 134 (1948) (statement
of Mr. Pavlov).
'4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suq'a note 7, art. 25(b).
'' Protocol to the European Convention, .supra note 9, art.3.
'' American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 23.
13

'7 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 9, art. 13().

" See Fox & ROTH, supra note 2,at 53-69. The Human Rights Committee described indetail the

requirements of Article 25 of the Political Covenant in a 1996 general comment. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Gen. Cut. 25, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 151 Oth mtg.
(1996).
' See Fox & ROTH, supra note 2, at 55-69.
2-"Id. at 82-84.
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must be careful not to overstate the case, it appears that whereas legal
questions of participation once blended seamlessly into broad debates of
political theory, the law in this area is now discrete, clear and relatively bereft
of debilitating ideological baggage. Few examining the treaty right to
political participation now dispute that virtually all parties seeking to

participate in an election must be permitted to do so 2-; that opposition parties
must be given equal access to mass media-22 ; that elections must be supervised
by independent bodies unaffiliated with any particular party with a stake in
the outcome 23; that ballots must be secret24; and that suffrage must be
universal.
Some may argue that positing these requirements as binding norms
amounts to retrofitting Cold War-era treaty language with meaning not
Given the profound
evident to (or even intended by) its drafters.
consequences that may follow from a principle of democratic legitimacy,
bearing, among other things, on norms of recognition and the use of force, 2

an agreement on the right's positivist bona fides is an essential first step. It is
certainly true that the degree of textual clarity now evident to treaty bodies
such as the Human Rights Committee 27, the American Commission on

Human Rights - and the European Court of Human Rights2- is a recent
21

See GUY GOODWIN-GilII., FREE AND FAIR

ILE CTIONS: INTERNA'IONAL LAW ANt) PRACTICE

52-

61 (1994). Most systems Impose minimal thresholds of demonstrated stupport aniong the
electorate. The European Cofmmission of Iluman Rights has upheld these requirements. See X v.
Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 6850/74, 5 Fur. Comm'n HR. Dec. & Rep. 90, 94
(1976). In addition, there is much support for the view that demonstrably anti-democratic parties
may be excluded fIrom elections. See Gregory 11. Fox & Georg Nolte, IntolerantDemocracies. 36
HARV. INT'L L. i. 1 (1995).
22 (OODWIN-GILt
23

i. at 35-42.

'1

h/. at 74-75.

,

supra note 21, at 67-71.

2' Id. at 42-46.
26, See, e.,., DAVID MALONE, DICISION-MAKING IN Till

HAITI, 1990-1997 (1999)

UN SECURITY COUNCIL: TIlE CASE OF

(discussing the Security Council's refusal to recognize the Haitian junta
that overthrew the elected president and eventual decision to aulthorize the use of Force to restore
the president to office).
27 General Comment 25, supra note 18 (detailing requirements of the right to political participatioi
under article 25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and noting that "article 25 lies at
the core of democratic government based oii the consent of the people and in conlbrmity with the
principles of the Covenant"); lhwvalya v. Zambia, Coiiimuii nication No. 314/1988, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/48/l)/3 14/1988 (1993) 1'[R[estrictions on political activity outside the only recognized
n reasonable restriction of the right to participate in the conduct of
political party aImoutiii to 111
public affairs.")
x See. e.g.. hIter-American Commission on Il uman Rights, Andres Aylwin Azocar et a]. v. Chile,
27,
1999), aailable at
11,863, para. 45 (Dec.
Report No. 137/99, Case
http://www.cidl.oas.org/aniuah6cp/99eng/Merits/(Cile11.863.htm ("[T]lie concept of representative democracy
and its protection is so important and such an essential part of the hemispheric system that it not
only sets it forth in its texts, from the first docutments, but an entire mechani sm of hemispheric
protection has been pit in place to address a breakdown of democracy in any of the metiiber
states.").
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phenomenon." One must be careful not to claim the entire history of these
treaty clauses as evidence of a broader customary democratic entitlement. But
there are several reasons to regard the developments of the 1990s as
contributing to a treaty-based right that is remarkably coherent and, as such,
increasingly legitimate in the eyes of state parties. First, as indicated, there is
virtual unanimity among the bodies charged with interpreting human rights
treaties regarding the elements of participatory rights. This is not a practice
whose relevance to treaty norms is tenuous or indeed controversial; it is as
"official" and ideologically neutral an understanding of the meaning of the
right as international law can provide. If there is an argument to be made that
the treaties' initial indeterminacy ought to preclude a later emerging
consensus on meaning, such an argument has not been accepted by these
bodies.' No such indeterminacy is evident, for example, in a recent opinion
of the Inter-American Commission ol Human Rights: "there is a conception
in the inter-American system of the fundamental importance of representative
democracy as a legitimate mechanism for achieving the realization of and
respect for human rights; and as a human right itself, whose observance and
defense was entrusted to the Commission."'

Or, in the more succinct

statement of the European Court of Human Rights: "[d]emocracy is without
' 33
doubt a fundamental feature of the European public order."
Second, there is a parallel body of practice that reinforces the textual
determinacy emerging from treaty body jurisprudence. This is the
increasingly frequent involvement of global and regional international
organizations in monitoring national elections. The standards of fairness
21 See,

e.g., Case of Matthews v. United Kingdom, Applic. No. 24833/94, para. 42 (Feb. 18, 1999),

atailable athtp://www.eclir.coe.int/eng ("[a]rticle 3 of Protocol No. I enshrines a characteristic of an
effective political democracy").
31'For a discussion of Cold War-era conflicts over the meaning and import of participatory rights,
see Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as Hutman Right, I HAR. HUM. Ris Y.B. 77 (1988).
Although the African Commission on luman and Peoples' Rights has not [llowed its fellow
human rights treaty bodies in addressing matters of textual ambiguity, it has issued several
strongly-worded condemnations of coups against elected regimes and voiced support forregular
elections. See Fox & RoTi, supra note 2, at 66-68.
31 The rules of treaty interpretation certainly allow recent practice to clarily the meaning of text,
whether as "ordinary meaning," subsequent practice or otherwise. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
32

Aylwin v. Chile, supra note 28, para. 46.

33 Case of the United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, No. 133/ 1996/752/951,

para. 45

I 219192552&Notice=
(Jan. 30, 1998), at hlp://hudoc.echi.coe.intliudoc/ViewRoot.asp'lteii=O&Action-Htil&X=
31 See POSTCONFLICT FIiECTiONS, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE (Krishna

Kumar ed., 1998); YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES,
REFERENDA AND NATIONAL EtLECTIONS: SEt t-DETERMiNATION AND TRANSITION 10
DEMOCRACY (1998); GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, CODES OF CONDUCT FOR Ft .ECIiONS: A STIDY
PREPARED FOR THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION (1994); CARt W. DUNDAS, ORGANISING
prepared for
FREE AND FAIR ELEcTIONS AT COST-Li FECi\'E LEVELS (1993) (study
Commonwealth Secretariat).
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promulgated by monitors, and, by extension, the organizations they represent,
have consistently paralleled treaty based-participatory rights on questions
such as the necessary neutrality of the body supervising elections, the
requirement of party pluralism, etc." An argument can be made that the
practice of monitoring is an even more significant indicator of consensus on
standards, since monitors are confronted at every turn with overwhelming
political pressures to compromise. Declaring an election to be in some sense
"unfair" promises almost certain political upheaval in the monitored state. It
also poses a difficult decision for other states as to whether they should
recognize a regime holding power after a legally suspect election. That
monitors have not succumbed to these very real pressures, and have been
willing on occasion to deem the results of certain elections invalid, suggests
a willingness to subordinate an expedient stability to the notions of
democratic legitimacy represented by electoral fairness." International law
has traditionally accorded substantial weight to nornative choices borne of
such circumstances.
The quantitative developments involve the extent to which notions
of popular participation and democratic legitimacy have emerged as
components of international norms that are themselves unrelated to
democracy. An example is protection of the environment, which instruments
and resolutions of international organization increasingly describe as
dependent on transparent decision-making by government, full public
participation, and a free flow of information from regulators to citizens and
vise-versa. 7 Another area is the recognition criteria for new states and
governments, adopted both by individual states and international
organizations. Traditionally, notions of democratic legitimacy had little role
in either case, and indeed appeared to be affirnatively excluded by decisions
such as the Tinoco arbitration." But in settings such as the dissolution of the
Former Yugoslavia and Soviet Unions, disputes over the credentials of
delegates to the UN General Assembly, and collective non-recognition of
usurping military regimes in Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Pakistan, the principle
35 See generalli' Fox & ROII , supra note 2, at 85-89.
3' One recent example ofimany that could be cited is reaction to the October 15, 200(1 elections in

Belarus, which the U.S. State Department, the OSCE and the EU concluded "were not free, fair
or transparent." As a result, theUnited States stated that it did not "accept the results of the
elections and will continue to accept the democratically elected 13' Supreme Soviet, led by
Chairman Semyon Sharetsk, as the legitimate parliament of Belarus." U.S. Department of State
Office of the Spokesman: Statement by Philip T.Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, Belarts: Elections
at
oil
October
15
Were
not
Democratic,
available
http://secietary.state.go\/\,w/britfings/statenents/2000/psOO1016a.hynit
(Oct. 16. 2000.

37 See Jonas Ebbesson, The Notion of 'Pblic ParticipatioiinInternational Environiental Law,8

Y.13. INT'iENv. L. 51 (1997).
3' Tin oco Concessions .Arbitratioii, I R.I.A.A. 369 11923).
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of democratic legitimacy has prevailed." Two international organizationsthe EU and MERCOSUR - have gone a step further and limited their
membership to "democratic" states."
As these and other areas of international law come to resemble
national regulatory regimes -both in the subjects they address and the degree
of their complexity - treaty drafters have begun to infuse their
States with
implementation mechanisms with democratic values.
unrepresentative and non-transparent bureaucracies are unlikely to foster the
cultures of compliance so necessary for these regimes to succeed. While the
lack of financial resources and trained personnel, as well as pervasive
instability and other factors, are surely important reasons for the failure of
many developing countries to implement international regulatory obligations,
empirical research suggests problems of governance may be an equally
important variable.4
In particular, those who defend expenditure of
international organizations' scarce resources on democratization efforts argue
that democratic governance is an essential prerequisite to progress on a
42
variety of other social goals.
But to accept the view that international regimes have come to
resemble their domestic counterparts (in environment, minority protection,
criminal procedure, etc.) does not require privileging democratization over
other conditions undoubtedly conducive to effective governance. It is simply
to understand that international law has taken a significant leap forward in
positing a link between democratization and effective implementation of
norms. Recognizing this limited but essential function of democratic
governance has, I would argue, significant implications for the status of a
democratic norm itself. It suggests that the sources of democratic nons are
now three-fold: human rights treaties containing participatory rights clauses,
the practice of international election monitors, and the proliferation of
participatory mechanisms in international regulatory regimes.

3'

For a comprehensive discussion, see Sean 1). Murphy, Democratic Legitimacv and the
Recognition o States and Governments, in FOX & ROlH, supra note 2, at 123, 143-51.

41'Treaty

on European Union, Title I(F), 31 I.L.M. 256 (1992); Protocol de Ushuaia Sobre
deChile, arts 4
Repuliblica cle olii/a
R
liccat

Conprontiso Deiooc,'citicoe ielMercosurIa

& 5 (1996), available
at www.idrc.ca/lacro/investigacion/mecosur2. lnl,

41

See, e.g., United Nations Development Programme, Overcoming Human Poverty: UNDP Poverty
Report 2000, ch. 5 (2000), atailable at ,,n.dp.o-g/povertyreport/chapters/chapS.htTl

4,- i.
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III.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE INTERESTS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

This link to other nonative goals suggests that international law's
concern with democracy is substantially broader than a focus on the benefits
transitions may bring to citizens of a single state, either individually or
collectively. Prior to the end of the Cold War, inter-state discussion of
democratization, if it occurred at all, was marked by such a limited domestic
focus. In this it closely resembled debate among political theorists or scholars

of comparative politics." The dominant questions were whether democracy
is appropriate to particular states or regions and, if so, what form it should
take." But as national governments have been asked to assume ever more
onerous burdens in implementing complex international regulatory regimes,
the nature of this discussion has shifted. Democracy is now linked to the
realization of collective community goals, borne of the inter-state relations
that form the substance of international law. These newerjustifications posit
claims about how democratic societies act collectively as subjects of
international law. They suggest, with important caveats, that democratic
states are more likely to further the goals of contemporary international law,
5
particularly those of the new regulatory regimes.1
The "democratic peace" thesis is perhaps the best-known example of
these inter-state justifications - the view that democratic states do not go to
war with each other." Democratic governance is hypothesized to further one
of the essential goals of the post-war international legal order: "to maintain
international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.""'
43

Some post-Cold War political science literature retains this focus. See, e.g., IELD, supra note 5.

' This was essentially the nature ol+ debate over participatory rights articles in the Universal
Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See ROSAS, supra note
II; MANFI RED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS : CCPR
COMMENTARY ( 993).
'5 The U.S. State Department
has made this claimi
in extremely broad terms, asserting that
democratic states further
virtually every fbreign policy goal olfthe United States. "Democratically
governed nations are more likely to secure the peace, deter aggression, expand open markets,
promote economic development, protect American citizens, combat international terrorism and
crime, uphold hutiman and worker rights, avoid humanitarian crises and refugee flows, improve the
global environment, and protect human health." Alission Statementofi the 0//ice ol'Deitocracyv,
Bureaut of )emocracy, IHLuman Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State (May 5, 2000)
[hereinafter
Mission
Statement],
ai,iabl,
a
'w st ai egov/ ww,,sgo ba]tji7
iztlaI rtights/denocracy/drl-democmissio.ltht ml.
41 Sce JOHN M. OwEN IV, LIBERAL PEACE, LIBERAL WAR: AMERICAN POLTtICS AND
INTERNATIONAl SECURITY (1997); DEBATING TE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael F. Brown &
Sean M. Lynn-Jones eds., 1996); BRuCE RUSSiEI. GRASPING THE DIEMOCRATIC PEACE (1993).
17

U.N. CHARTER, art. I, para. I.
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The Security Council has made this connection twice in the exercise of its

Chapter VII powers, finding the overthrow of a legitimate elected government
to justify the use of military force in order to return the elected leaders to
power. In the case of Haiti in 1994, the Security Council called for
"restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately
elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, within the framework of the
Governors Island Agreement," and found that tile Haitian military's failure to
do so constituted a threat to the peace."" In the case of Sierra Leone in 1998,
the Council also found a military coup to constitute a threat to the peace and
demanded in Resolution 1132 that "the militaryjunta take immediate steps to
relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the
democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order.",
The Council later commended an African regional organization for its
intervention to restore the government of Ahmad Teian Kabbah."
Another, related justification is the role of democratic institutions in
preventing or resolving civil conflict within states. This view, articulated by
the UN Secretary-General among others, is that rights to political
participation address the exclusionary and divisive politics at the heart of
many civil wars." A third justification (noted above), is the evident
compatibility between the goals of democratic institutions and increasingly
complex international regulatory regimes. Especially where regimes require
governments to target and alleviate social ills in impoverished areas, a lack of
political accountability can present a significant barrier to implementation.
Tile United Nations Development Program has noted this phenomenon in
assessing whether multilateral anti-poverty programs actually result in poverty
reduction:
When governments are unaccountable or corrupt, poverty reduction
programmes have little success in targeting benefits. The poor
cannot gain a hearing for their views from undemocratic and
authoritarian political regimes. They cannot gain access to public
services from an unresponsive central bureaucracy - or know that
they services exist if they lack information. Even when services are

4 SC Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 3413th mtg.,U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
SC Res. 1132. U.N. SCOR, 3822d ntg., I. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997).
S,
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1998/5 (26 Feb. 1998).
. See Repot of'the Secretoi',-Generaloniithe Work of'tlie
Organization. para. 98, U.N. Doc.A/55/1(2000).
("[T]he provision of electoral assistance is a vital component of the United Nations system's overall
peace-building and democratization strategies.")
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decentralized, the poor might not benefit if a local elite diverts the
resources for its own interests 2
A final and very recent example involves the role of international
huLman rights norms in transitional justice. Shortly after German unification,
courts in the newly unified state convicted three former East German citizens
of involvement in the deaths of persons attempting to escape over the Berlin
Wall. After their convictions were affirmed by the German Constitutional
Court, the three brought a claim to the European Court of Human Rights,
arguing that their acts had not been criminal under the East German laws in
force at the time they were committed, and that their convictions constituted
an e.x post imposition of new standards in violation of Article 7(2) of the
European Convention on Human Rights. 3 The European Court unanimously
rejected their claims, finding no violation.,4
Of interest for present purposes is the concurring opinion of Judge
Levits, who addressed the question of whether courts in a democratic state
were bound to pay deference to the interpretive methodologies of courts in
non-democratic states. His inquiry responded to the applicants' claim that
even if East German law could be read to prohibit their acts, no East German
court would have condemned their actions on that basis. This applied equally,
they argued, to international human rights treaties, to which East Germany
was party, and which also arguably prohibited their acts at the border. The
defendants' argument, in other words, relied on the status accorded human

rights norms in East German law. For Judge Levits, these claims implicated
the very different ways democratic and non-democratic states approach the
rule of law, including international human rights law:
Democratic States can allow their institutions to apply the law even previous law, originating in a pre-democratic regime - only in
a manner which is inherent in the democratic political order (in the
sense in which this notion is understood in the traditional
democracies). Using any other method of applying the law (which

52

Overcoming Htman Poverty, supra note 41. These conclusions were accepted by the UN
Commission on Human Rights in a resolution entitled Contiting Dialogue oit Aleasures to
Promote amd Consolidate Democracy, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2001/4 (Apr. 23, 2001). See also

the March 22, 2001 remarks of Italian Foreign Minister Lanrberto Dini, warning a meeting of
Horn of Africa Foreign Ministers that development in the region would be difficult "without
that respect human digniy and basic h11uman rights." HORN OF AFRICA:
democratic institutions
IRIN-IIOA Update (Mar. 22, 2001).

5 Case of Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Application Nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98
coe.int/en.
at hulp://ww.echr,
(Mar, 22,2001). aivilable

1,1i.at 38.
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implies reaching different results from the same legal texts) would
damage the very core of the orh'e public of a democratic state.
The same principles are equally valid with regard to the
interpretation and application of the norms of international law,
like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
Covenant has been signed and ratified by most states in the world democratic and non-democratic (including the former GDR). A
democratic state can interpret and apply the Covenant (and other
international legal norms) only according to the methodology of
application of the law which is inherent in the democratic political
order. In the present case that was done by the Genran domestic
courts...
Consequently, interpretation and application of national or
international legal norms according to socialist or other nondemocratic methodology (with results intolerable for a democratic
system) should from the standpoint of a democratic system be
regarded as wrong. That applies both to ex post facto assessment of
the legal practice of previous non-democratic regimes (as in the
instant case, although tile same situation may obviously arise in other
new democracies) and to assessment of the actual legal practice (e.g.
regarding the Covenant) of today's non-democratic regimes. That
practice should be regarded as a misuse of law. After the change to a
democratic political order the persons responsible cannot rely for
justification of their conduct o the "specific" way in which law is
interpreted by non-democratic regimes."
On the view suggested by these examples, effective implementation
of trade, environmental, human rights, judicial assistance and other complex
regulatory regimes, is more likely to take place when the implementing state
permits broad citizen participation, practices transparency in important
aspects of governmental decision-making, possesses an independent judiciary
and allows vigorous media scnltiny of its actions. States lacking some or all
of these attributes are unlikely to compel substantial adherence to their own
domestic laws save through force. This inability to secure compliance is
likely to extend to international regimes as well.,
Id. at 46.
Ic
S6

For an extended discussion of these points, see Gregory 1H.Fox, Strengthcnig the State, 7 IND.
J.GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 35 (1999).
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One hastens to add that a lack of democratic institutions clearly does
not exhaust the possible reasons for non-compliance with international
obligations. Other impediments, such as a lack of resources, disruptive
interventions by other states, and the lingering effects of profound social
traumas such as colonialism, prolonged civil conflicts, and long-standing
authoritarian rle, clearly affect compliance.'7 Equally, hegemonic states may
see little advantage in adhering to norms that only constrain their actions in
situations of potential gain., It is difficult to imagine, for example, a policymaker in any but the most powerful of states declaring publicly,
'"international law' in political and military matters is increasingly exposed as
an academic sham. ''v
But for those inquiring into how an emerging democratic norm has
been assimilated into the larger body of international law, the point is not
whether or not a case can be made for democratization as the sole explanatory
variable in a state's adherence or non-adherence to international law.
Normative evolution is not a phenomenon gauged by empirical inquiry into
whether a new rule of international law has accomplished its intended goal.
The inroads made by a purported rule are measured rather by reference to the
broader legal frameworks of which the new norm is a product and in which it
would be situated. Thomas Franck has described such confluence with
existing rule structures as the quality of "adherence," drawing on H.L.A.
Hart's distinction between primary and secondary rules.' In the case of the
democratic entitlement, the synergy with the norms described above suggests
that the rule is "more likely to obligate" because it is in fact "made within the
framework of an existing normative hierarchy.",
Yet disjunctions with existing norm structures are evident as well.
Two issues deserve particular attention: the problem of democratic
legitimation and the problem of a normative hierarchy.

57 See ABRAM CIIAYES & ANTONIA IIANI)LIER CHAYES, T-i

NEW SOVEREIGNTY, COMPLIANCE

WITH INTERNATIONAL RiGUI.ATORY AGRI EMENTS 14 (1998) ("[i]n developing cotntries, the

characteristic situation is a severe dearth ol the requisite scienti lic, technical, bureaucratic, and
financial wherewithal to build effective domestic enforcement systems").
For a discussion of this phenomenon in the United States, see EDWARD C. LUCK, MIXED
MESSAGiES: AMERICAN PoIrrICS AND INTERNAI tONAl ORGANIZAT ION 1919-1999 (1999). This
view is supported by empirical data showing that democratic states are not more likely than other
states to adhere to treaty commitments. See Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Democratic States and
Coniiitoieit ill Internioional Relations, 50 INI'l- ORG. 109 (1996).
' John R. Bolton, Clinion Aleets "Ilnterational Law" in Kosovo, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1999, at 23.
FRANCK, supra note 12, at 183-84.
, Id. at 184
"
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THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION

Unlike most other internationally protected rights, democratic rights
are instrumental. Rights of bodily integrity, due process and freedom of
conscience for example, find justification in notions of human dignity or
autonomy that do not depend on the political context in which protected
individuals find themselves. Instead, violations of these rights are condemned
because the notions of personhood embodied in the rights are instantly
diminished upon the occurrence of a prohibited act. By contrast, rights of
participation derive from a democratic theory holding that political power is
legitimated only through manifestations of popular consent; in tile remarkable
words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "the will of the people
shall be the basis of the authority of government. '' - The value of participatory
rights is thus inseparable from the legitimation of political authority achieved
by their exercise. Participatory rights have little value in isolation where this
link to political authority is severed, such as when the military and not elected
officials wield actual power in a state.' Those who participate in elections do
so in order to imprint their views on national policy, and not simply to vote or
stand as a candidate for its own sake.On this view of democratic theory, the presence or absence of
participatory rights in a state calls into question the authority of leaders to
govern. The United States adheres to this principle in its own law. At least
since the early 1960s, federal courts have exercised equitable power to
overturn the results of elections tainted by fraud or other irregularities -instances, in other words, where participatory rights were not substantially
respected.61 International organizations have articulated the instrumentalist
1
view most clearly in condemning military coups that oust elected regimes.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that the Chilean
system of designating certain un-elected military officers "senators for life"
62
63

Universal Declaration of Il-tIuman Rights, art. 21(3), GA Res. 217A (Ill), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948).
Larry Diamond, Denocracy int Latin Anterica: Degrees.

Illusions, and Directions /br

Consolidation, inl BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: COLLECTIVELY DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICAS 52, 64-5 (Tom Farer ed., 1996).
64

1TE

Data suggest that such objectives have empirical grounding: "in any given country, the greater the
opportunities for expressing, organizing, and representing political preferences, the greater the
number and variety of preferences and interests that are likely to be represented in policy
making." ROBERi A. DAHIL, POLYARCHY 26

(197

I).

See generall Kenneth W. Start, Federal ludicial Invalidation cis a Rentedy.1br Irregularitiesil
State Elections, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1092 (1974).
66 In a June 1999 speech, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth declared that "no longer
wotLld the Commonwealth tolerate any one of its members slipping back into military rule or oneparty dictatorship." Cutltures of Democracy: A Commonwealth Perspective (.lune 21, 1999),
availablea www thecommonwealth.org/htm/info/info/speeches/97- I .htim
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had the effect of "watering down the real value of the popular vote, as it
accords priority to military institutions and officers who have nothing to do
with the perforiance of the legislative functions of the representative body." 7
This violates the participatory rights set out in the American Convention,
which require
at least that popular sovereignty be capable of being exercised
without any unjustified discrimination that works a real loss of value
in the power of the vote. A Senate composed in the terns provided
for by the Chilean Constitution does not guarantee the free
expression of the will of the voters, for the institution of designated
senators contained in Article 45 of the Constitution of Chile detracts
a significant quota of power from the citizen will.""
How far should this link between participatory rights and
governmental authority be taken?
Applied unsparingly to all
governments, a theory of democratic legitimacy would reject the authority
to govern not only of usurping military juntas but long-standing
monarchies and other regimes either un-elected or achieving power
through sham elections. This would seem to set international law on a
collision course with much of every day international relations, which
simply could not function unless such regimes were regarded as the
legitimate representatives of their states. There is little practice to
suggest the international community is prepared to delegitimate each and
every regime that fails to respect participatory rights in all their
particulars. No such long-standing regime has had its delegates'
credentials refused, had recognition by other states withdrawn, or been
the subject of an outside intervention on the grounds that it lacked a
popular mandate to rule. On the other hand, actions such as military
coups against elected regimes, where the popular sentiment has been
made plain and then clearly disregarded, are increasingly the subject of
condemnation and sanction.
The challenge for international lawyers is to find coherence in this
rather inconsistent application of the democratic legitimacy principle.9 The
, Aylwin V. Chile, supra note 28, para. 108.
shl.
para. 116.

'9 To muddy the waters further, even clear cases of electoral irregularities sometimes produce
ambiguous reactions. The U.S. government described its view of the 2000 elections in Peru as
follows:

[Llast year's Peruvian presidential and congressional elections were considered flawed
by Peruvian and iniernational observers. The organizations observing the elections,
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difficulty lies in the fact that the principle itself does not appear to allow for

selective application. If popular consent is indeed "the basis of the authority
of government,"7" then an illegitimate regime so defined should be

disqualified from acting on behalf of the state.7' The agency relationship
between the regime and the state, when defined by principles of democratic
legitimacy, is severed and the authority of the regime to govern withdrawn.
The right of a people to resist and, ultimately, oust a regime acting contrary to

their interests is central to contractarian notions of popular sovereignty. The

"right of revolution" against illegitimate regirnes lay at the origin of the
American democratic system and continues to attract modern theorists12
But when democratic rights are embodied in international law, the

actors affected by its violation are not citizens denied opportunities for
participation, but other states. As with any international norm, the obligation
to provide democratic governance is state-to- state in nature, and, in the event
of a breach, the aggrieved right-holders are the states to whom the obligation

runs. Perhaps more importantly, other states must also refrain from
recognizing the consequences of the breaching state's illegal acts -- this in
order to deprive that state of any ill-gotten gains." For example, in order to
including the Organization of American States, shared the view that the repeated
irregularities in the electoral process prevented the Perusvian citizenry frorn participating
in credible democratic elections. As a result, President Alberto Fujimori began his third
presidential term under a cloud o/ illkgitimacV in late Jily 2000.
Hearing Be/bre the House Conm. on hit'l Relations. Subconint. on II. Hemisphere (Mar. 14,
2001) (statement of Sutsan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade,
General Accounting Office) (emphasis added).
7 Universal Declaration, supra note 62, art. 2 1.
7EFrnst-Ulrich Petersman suiggests how broadly such a legitimacy principle might sweep:
There is also a need to consider the apparent contradictions between the human rights
premises of democratic constitutions and the state-centered and power-oriented premises

of classical international law. If human rights require all governments to protect
individual freedom and the equal rights ol their citizens, and the legitimacy and rights of
governments derive from respect For the political human rights of their citizens and fbr
democratic decision-making procedures, do the international law principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention also shield dictatorial governments that suppress the
human rights of their citizens? Does the contribution of state practice to the formatfion of
customary law rules depend on the democratic legitimacy of governments? Is it
consistent with Universal human rights to contintte concepitualizing international law as
based on state-centered principles of effectiveness and legal order regardless of the
democratic legitimacy of governments?
Ernst-Ulrich Petersman, Constitutionalisn aiid International Ad(]udication: How to
Constitutionalizethe U.N. Dispute Settlenieit System?. 31 N.Y.U. J. INt'L L. & Pot. 753, 762
(1999).
7
_See. e.g., Michael Walzer, The MoralStanding ol'States, 9 Ptt Os. & PUt. AFF. 209, 214 (1980).
7 This principle is often expressed in the maxim ex iijuria.jusnon oritur. See [AN BOWNLIE.
PRINCtt'LES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 511-12 (4th ed. 1990).
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make concrete the prohibition on the unilateral use of force, states may not
recognize the forcible annexation of another state's territory." In the case of
democratic rights, the international community or, at a minimum, other state
parties to human rights treaties containing participatory rights, would seem
obligated to avoid treating the illegitimate regime as the proper agent of its
state. Otherwise they would confer upon the regime the very thing sought by
the undemocratic usurpers: the capacity to exercise power in the name of the
state. For other states, simply carrying on normal bilateral relations would
appear to confer such a status, since the regime would be treated as
appropriately holding rights and incurring obligations in the name of the state.
Here it is important to keep in mind that it is the state and not its government
that carries international personality and becomes subject to the rules of
international law. A democratic legitimacy principle would deny nondemocratic regimes status as agents of the state, much like the rules of
domestic law define which natural persons are entitled to act as agents for
legal persons (corporations, partnerships, etc).
In light of this rather black and white conception of governmental
legitimacy, it is useful to consider the potential spectrum of cases in which the
rule would be applicable. At one end, the easiest case, would be the
overthrow of a leader who had been chosen in an election declared tobe free
and fair by one or more international organizations. This more or less fits the
situation of Haiti in 1991 and Sierra Leone in 1994. Not only did the UN
Security Council declare the coups "illegal" in both cases, but it approved the
use of external military force to restore the elected leaders to power. Given
the widespread and geographically diverse condemnations of coups cited
above, it seems safe to conclude that the legitimacy principle is not in danger
4 In Resolution 662 (1990), the Security Council declared that the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait
"Under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity and is considered null and void."
More generally, the International Law Commission provides in its Dlraft Articles on State
Responsibility that where a state comm its
"serioLs breaches of international obligations owed to
the international community as a whole," all other states inuLst adhere to the following obligations:
(a)
(b)

Not to recognize as lawful the situation created by the breach;
Not to render aid or assistance to the responsible State in maintaining the

(c)

situation so created;
To cooperate as tbr as possible to bring the breach to an end.

Drat articles provisionilly adopted biVthe Dro ing Committee on Second Reading, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/L.600, art. 42, para. 2. (2000). 1lowever, when presented with the opportunity to hold a

forcible annexation void per se, without firher action by international political bodies, the
International Cotirt of justice declined to do so in the East Timor Case. ,SeeCase Concerning East
Timor (Port. v. Austi.), 1995 I.C.J.
4. For a critical view o1 the Couirt's approach to collective
non-recognition in tiis case, see Thom:as 1). Grant, East Tiino; the U.N. Sistei and Enfbrcing
Non-Recognition i Inteialitial Lair, 33 VANI). J. TRANSNAi't L. 273, 306-10 (2000).
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of being compromised in such cases. If it were, the norm would face a direct
and substantial challenge. For the international community to validate a
particular regime as democratically legitimate, and then engage in an equally,
or perhaps more, effective validation of that regime's usurper, would clearly
transfer both decisions from the realm of law to that of politics. The evidence
discussed above suggests that such a reflexive acceptance of any regime
exercising effective control in a state is simply no longer acceptable.
A less clear-cut case of legitimacy would involve accretions of power
short of overturning the results of an election. President Alberto Fujirnori's
arguably unconstitutional 1992 dissolution of the Peruvian Congress and
sacking of judges fits this category." Likewise, Second Prime Minister of
Cambodia Hun Sen's 1997 assumption of powers legally delegated to the
First Prime Minister, an event widely described as a "coup." 7 In each of
these cases, action was taken that arguably diluted the voters' preferences by
substantially altering the political and legal landscape they had approved in an
election. Unlike the straightforward ouster of an elected leader these acts
were not only taken by incumbent leaders, who were themselves elected, but
deeming the acts "illegal" presented difficult questions of constitutional
interpretation. Legitimacy norns, such as the Inter-American Democratic
Charter"7 , clearly do not provide that every unconstitutional act of a
government vitiates its authority to rule. On the other hand, the
condemnation of Hun Sen and Fujimori's actions suggests the international
community is prepared to question the democratic legitimacy of regimes
whose acts fall short of outright coups d'etat. As Steven Schnably has
shown, when the legality of such acts is unclear under national law, their
permissibility under broad-brush international standards of "democracy"
becomes highly uncertain., For this reason, one may regard the differing
outcomes in such cases not as a compromise of the democratic legitimacy
principle, but as a consequence of its application to legally ambiguous sets of
facts.
A third scenario, perhaps residing at the opposite end of the
spectrum, involves the regime that has long held power without an election
or with elections that clearly do not measure up to international standards.

7 See Domingo E. Acevedo & Claudia Grossman, The Organization of'American States and the
Protection of*Democrac"V, in FARER, stipra note 63, at 140-42.
76 See Orna Ben-Naftali & Antigoni Axenidou, "Accredito" Ergo Stit: Rellections on the Question
of'Representation in the Wake of the Cambodian Representation Problem in the Fiity-Second
Session o/'the General Assembl,. 27 DENV. J. INT'I. L. & POL'Y 151 (1998).
77 See
Inter-American
Democratic
Charter
(Sept
II, 2001),
araitble aW
htip://wwv.oas.oig/Chaiter/docs/resolutionl

en p4.him.

71 See Stephen Schnably, Constitutionalismi and Democratic Goverment iii the Inter-Amtericant
System, in FOx & ROTH, supra note 2, at 123, 143-51.
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Most regimes in the Arab countries of the Middle East would fit this
category." As noted, there is virtually no precedent for action by international
organizations or individual states challenging the legitimacy of such regimes.
Is there any basis in the principles of democratic governance now emerging
to distinguish non-democracies of long endurance from the widely
condemned perpetrators of coups against elected leaders'? One basis for
doing so would be the claim that citizens may approve of an un-elected
regime, and in particular one holding power for many years, even though they
have not been asked to formalize their preferences in an election. It might be
argued that if citizens have not risen up in rebellion against such a regime, the
international community should at least, in Michael Walzer's terminology,
presume a "fit" between the regime and the citizenry.," Walzerjustifies such
a presumption on the grounds that the right of any people to rebel against
their government cannot be transferred to outsiders seeking, in essence, to
foment a revolution in their stead:
[A] state is legitimate or not depending upon the 'fit' of the
government and community, that is, the degree to which the
government actually represents the political life of its people. When
it doesn't do that, the people have a right to rebel. But if they are
free to rebel, then they are also free not to rebel - because they (or
the greater number of them) judge rebellion to be imprudent or
uncertain of success or because they feel that 'slowness and aversion
...to quit their old Constitution,' which Locke noted in his Second
Treatise. That is, they still believe the government to be tolerable,
or they are accustomed to it, or they are personally loyal to its
leaders. And so arguments about legitimacy ... must be addressed
to the people who make up a particular community. Anyone can
make such arguments, but only subjects or citizens can act on them."
The argument is thus: unlike the demonstrable expression of public
choice evident in an election reversed by a coup, the legitimacy of a longstanding authoritarian government is unknown. Walzer does acknowledge

that in certain extreme cases, such as widespread massacres or an attempted
7 Each country must, of course, be evaluated on its own terms. Yemen would likely not fit
in this
category. Egypt holds regular elections, though severe restrictions on parties and criticism ol'the
government color their fairness. Lebanon also holds regular elections under a carefully calibrated
scheme negotiated at the end of the civil war. Critics, however, point to Syrian domination of
Lebanese politics as a severe restriction on the ability of elected officials to put the views of their
CoSti tients into practice.
s" Walzer, sutpra note 72, at 214.
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secession, a lack of "fit" should be presumed.x- But short of such radical

estrangement between government and citizenry, one cannot presume that the
lack of free and fair elections means that a government does not find favor
with some or most of its citizens. Given a lack of efforts to oust the regime,
one should presume the opposite.
It is certainly too soon in the evolution of a democratic entitlement to
tell whether this argument is sufficient to rescue an apparently absolutist
theory of legitimacy. There are certainly reasons why this argument is not
entirely persuasive as a limiting principle. After all, the fundamental purpose
of an election is to put the legitimacy of a regime to empirical test, and for a
regime to resist empirical validation while insisting that validation is to be
presumed strains credulity. On the other hand, from the perspective of the
democratic entitlement, it may not be sufficient "even for a dictatorship to
hold a verifiably honest plebiscite on the continuation of dictatorial rnle, since
the 'proper conditions' for the exercise of popular will require a remaking of
authoritarian institutions to allow for knowing, willing and intelligent
collective choice. '"N 3 What is more likely is resistance to an absolutist
principle on other grounds: that it runs counter to the universalist aspirations
of most international organizations; that it casts doubt on the principle of
juridical equality among states; and that it may severely impair the
practicalities of day-to-day diplomatic exchange. Whether a coherent norm
emerges from this critique is fodder for future scholars.

V.

THE PROBLEM OF A NORMATIVE HIERARCHY

A second problem arises from the claim that the principle of
democratic governance sits atop a normative hierarchy. Tom Farer describes
this view of democratic governance as a "master right" - one "that, if it exists,
would serve as the keystone of the entire human rights apparatus."'"
Assuming a goal of protecting the broad range of human rights, the
international community ought to focus its energies on transitions to
democracy, for regimes accountable to their citizens are more likely to
institutionalize the protection of human rights in domestic law." Given the
Id. at 216-18; see also MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 86-108 (2d ed. 1992).
Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, lItroduction: the Spread of' Liberal Democracy and its
hnplications fbr International Law. in FOX & ROTIt, sutpra note 2, at 14.
84 The Human Right to Participate in Government: Toward an Operational Definition, 82 AM.
82
13

SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 505 (1988) (remarks of Professor Farer).
85 United Nations organs have issued broad endorsements of democratic governance as crucial to
securing adherence to human rights See, e.g.. G.A. Res. 55/96, U.N.GAOR, 55th Sess., (2001).
("[rlecognizing the indissoluble link between human rights as enshrined in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights and in the international human rights treaties and the foundation
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unfortunate weakness of international human rights institutions, the most
promising strategy for international law is to secure reliable enforcement
through domestic mechanisms. Thus, according to the heirarchical view, a
democratic entitlement not only promises the most effective means of
securing huiran rights, but it relieves international institutions of an
enforcement role for which they are eminently unsuited.
A variety of reasons are offered for the relation between
representative government and respect for human rights. Most derive from
the view that the exercise of power by representative institutions, and in
particular the regular transfer of authority pursuant to agreed-upon rules
rather than by force of arms, is fundamentally grounded in the rule of law and
respect for individual rights." Principles recognizing a citizen's entitlement to
alter the direction of national policy, it is claimed, are necessarily broad
enough to protect the physical and intellectual integrity of each citizen. John
Stuart Mill offered the more pragmatic argument that the public's rights and
interests will only be secure if citizens themselves participate in their
protection. 7 Otherwise, citizens rely wholly on the good will of the few who
monopolize political power: "in the absence of its natural defenders, the
interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when
looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons whom it
directly concerns."" Thus, "the rights and interests of every or any person are
only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is himself
able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them. ' ,
It seems a small step from this "master right" view to regarding free
and fair elections as the preeminent goal of the human rights movement.
Pragmatic concerns bolster this conclusion. Elections are relatively easy to
monitor and assess when compared to other protected rights." While some
accuse international election observers of focusing on an unjustifiably narrow
set of criteria in determining an election's fairness - often aniving, it is
claimed, only after the bulk of a campaign is over and deploying only in large
of any democratic society"); Report of the Secretary-General: Supplement to Reports on
Democratization, UN Doc. A/51/761, Annex, para. 3 (1996) ("the practice o1' democracy is
increasingly regarded as essential to progress on a wide range of human concerns and to the
protection of human rights").
See generally, Gregory 1-. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, in Fox & ROTH, supra
note 2, at 389, 396-99. For the view that such claims wrongly conflate substantive democracy,
popular sovereignty and constitutionalism, see Brad R. Roth, Evaluating Democratic Progress. in

id. at 493.
'7 JOHN STUART MILl, CONSIDtRATIONS ON Rt PRES-NTATIVE GOVERNMENT 55-80 (Prometheus

Books 19911 (1859).
Id. at 66.
'9 id. at 65.
See National Sovereignt , Revisited: Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Demnocracy in
International Law, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT' tL. PROC. 249, 270 (1992) (remarks of Gregory H. Fox).
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cities"'- such missions would appear as models of breadth and precision if
one tries to imagine efforts that could realistically be mounted to monitor
rights against torture, due process in criminal proceedings, arbitrary
execution, freedom of expression, freedom of association, etc. International
organizations are simply not equipped to provide comprehensive oversight of
the myriad state institutions potentially involved in violating these and other
rights protected by treaty. At most, they might study a state's human rights
record retrospectively and make recommendations for reform or
accountability, as opposed to efforts to halt abuses as they occur. 2 It is
difficult to imagine the international cormnunity securing better compliance
with other rights than is now achieved in regard to elections.
Apart from criticizing the priority of elections in transitions to more
liberal societies, "3 one may raise concerns even if the "master right"
hypothesis were accepted on its own terms. First, a focus on elections may
lead to profound definitional confusion as to when a regime has become, is
about to become, or has ceased to be "democratic." Given the many
consequences that may follow from a finding of democratic illegitimacy, as
detailed above, clarity in this area is no small concern. Fareed Zakaria
describes a class of states he labels "illiberal democracies," ones in which
reasonably fair elections take place but fail to protect a variety of other civil
and political rights. "4 If measured solely by electoral fairness, these states
might well be entitled to all the benefits international law offers to
democratically legitimate regimes. Yet, if shortfalls in other areas of human
rights are taken into account, as seems necessary, given that one of the prime
justifications for an election-centered view of democracy is better protection
of human rights generally, how is the legitimacy of a regime to be measured'?
Should the criteria be expanded to include all other internationally protected
human rights? If only a few "crucial" rights factor into the legitimacy
calculus, which ones are to be included? Must the violations be widespread
and systematic, or are a few, high-profile violations sufficient? Does it matter
that violations occur during a government campaign against a rebel
insurgency movement that itself commits egregious human rights violations'?
These are the types of questions that lead some to conclude that
91 See Thomas Carothers, The Observers Observed, 8 J. DEMOC. 17 (July 1997).
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For a graphic account of the international community's failure to heed clear warnings about
violence in Rwanda - later the object of retrospective justice in the form of an international

criminal tribunal, see GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: H-ISTFORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995).
See Susan Marks, International Law, Demnocracv and the End ofHistorv, in Fox & RoTti, supra
note 2, at 532, 564 (arguing that "[d]emocracy involves no necessary order of events"). But see
Dahl, suprat note 64, at 33-47 (arguing that sequencing in democratic transitions is correlated to
the long-term stability of democratic institutions).
9 See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of llliberal Democracies, FOREIGN AFF. Nov./Dec. 1997, at 22.
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democracy is an "essentially contested concept," one incapable of agreed
quantification and therefore precise definition." In the realm of political
theory this is entirely appropriate, as many hold with Isaiah Berlin that
arguments about political liberty are marked by an ineluctable plurality of
values."' But when democratic legitimacy is deployed as a legal rule by
institutions wielding power to exact consequences for non-compliance,
definitional clarity is essential. We may well be able to muddle through by
speaking of elections and "associated rights," but the close case, demanding
exacting scrutiny, is sure to arise.
Second, the construction of a normative hierarchy is not simply an
exercise in abstraction; it draws crucial support from empirical hypotheses
about the likely social benefits of transitions to democracy. The United
States, for example, claims that democratic states outperforn other regimes
in areas as diverse as peacefulness, economic development and public
health. 7 Are such hypotheses valid'? One would certainly receive a negative
answer from many citizens in Russia and former communist countries in
Eastern and Central Europe, states in which the transition to "democracy" has
been accompanied by an increase in social pathologies of virtually every kind.
For these people, as for many in the developing world, the normative
hierarchy suggested by the democratic entitlement is exactly backwards:
economic and social rights, among others, must be the primary goal, for they
have not been secured (as hypothesized) as a secondary consequence of
political democracy. One can well imagine how the arguments in this wellrehearsed debate would proceed. The point here is not to defend an empirical
claim but to suggest the precariousness involved in tethering a normative
framework to such a claim.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite the many dangers lurking in advancing democratic
governance as a norm of international law, it is my view that the international
community has reached a point of no return on this question. This is not
primarily because of a profound philosophical commitment to the principle of
popular sovereignty; while many states hold such a view, it is also clear that
many do not. It is rather due to international law's ever-growing concern
with issues related to governance. Inter-state relations increasingly focus not
on areas beyond national jurisdiction (the high seas), the nature of states

See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepis, 56 PROC. ARISTOTfELIAN SOC. 107 (1956).
"

See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts olLiberti, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).

, See Mission Statement. supra note 45.
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themselves (the acquisition of territory), points of interaction involving
official representatives (diplomatic relations, anried conflict) or legal fictions
defining when and how a state has been injured (expropriation, diplomatic
protection, state responsibility), but on acts solely within national territory
having no necessary or direct effect on other states. International lenders such
as the World Bank, the IMF and various regional banks are intimately
involved in the budgeting priorities of many states in the developing world.
Regional economic integration, well underway in Europe and beginning or
planned in Latin America, Africa and South East Asia, involves
standardization of every type of domestic regulatory norm. Environmental
norms involve the creation of new or expanded domestic regimes, as well as
transparent decision-making processes that allow citizens to bring
environmental concerns to the attention of governments. The proposed
International Criminal Court will require many states to revise their criminal
procedure laws in order to cooperate with the Court in the manner set out in
the Rome Statute. " Likewise, human rights tribunals have passed on all
manner of governance questions, from amnesty laws to the banning of
political parties and candidates to the extradition of criminal suspects.
If international law is now a presence in virtually every area of
national policy, it cannot be expected to withdraw from the question of which
governing institutions are best suited to carry out these policies efficaciously.
The question of "good government" simply arises too often in the work of too
many international organizations for it to become a secondary issue. And, as
states recognize that the most serious global issues require collective action
among strong and efficient national institutions - one thinks of efforts to
combat global warming and regulation of the interneta focus on
governance will be all but inevitable. For international lawyers, this
explosion in practice, directly relevant to the substance of a new and
controversial norm, is a challenge for future analysis and scholarship.

s Rome Statute of tie International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic

Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, art. 3. The treaty must be ratified by 60 countries before it
comes into force.

